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I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an equitable action brought by Respondents for 
specific enforcement of a Uniform Real Estate Contract entered 
into by and between the parties. 
II. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Sixth Judicial District Court granted Respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment requiring Appellants to transfer 
title to certain real property to Respondents upon payment by 
Respondents to Appellants of certain sums, each party to bear 
its own costs and attorney's fees. 
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III. NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask this Court to reverse the judgment of the 
district court in tote, remanding the matter for trial. Respon-
dents, by way of cross-appeal, also seek the reversal of the 
judgment of the district court insofar as said court refused to 
grant an award of costs and attorney's fees in favor of 
Respondents. Further, Respondents ask this Court to award costs 
and attorney's fees in favor of Respondents on this appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 20th day of December, 1975, Appellants, as 
buyers, entered into a written Agreement with H. Vance and 
Emily B. Pope, as sellers, for the purchase and sale of certain 
real and personal properties situated in Panguitch, Garfield 
County, State of Utah (Record 110, 121). Said "Pope" Agreement 
(R. 7-26) concerned the transfer of a motel, cafe, trailer park, 
and several, residential dwellings for the price of $270,000.00 
(R. 110). Warranty Deeds to said real property were required, 
by paragraph 19 of said Agreement to be placed in escrow with 
First State Bank, Panguitch Branch, to be released only upon 
fulfillment of all of the terms and requirements of the escrow 
agreement. Additionally, Appellants were required by paragraph 
16 of said Agreement to execute and deliver to the Popes real 
-2-
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estate mortgages on additional real properties owned by Appellants 
including their personal residences and a piece of property 
located near Panguitch Lake (Transcript 10). Said mortgages 
constituted second liens against the residences as further 
security for all real and personal properties purchased on the 
"Pope" Agreement. 
On or about the 10th day of April, 1978, Appellants, as 
sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 4-5) 
with Tom C. Thorpe, a strawman for Respondents. All negotiations 
relating to said Uniform Real Estate Contract were in fact 
between Appellants and Respondents (T. 11-12). Said "Thorpe" 
Contract concerned the purchase and sale of only a portion of the 
real property purchased under the "Pope" Agreement for a sum of 
$300 ,000. 00 (R. 122; T. 2 I 12). 
Using a standard printed form supplied and prepared by 
Respondent, Nick Faulkner, a real estate broker (T. 22), the 
parties acknowledged, in paragraph 6, the underlying obligation 
against the property pursuant to the "Pope" Agreement. However, 
the parties supplemented the printed form with the typewritten 
clause "which shall be the Sellers obligation to pay and 
discharge," referring to the "Pope" obligation. At the time of 
contracting and upon payment by Respondents to Appellants of a 
$35,000.00 down payment required in the "Thorpe" Contract, the 
outstanding obligation on said Contract was in fact smaller than 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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than the unpaid balance on the "Pope" Agreement (T. 12-13}. 
The subject "Thorpe" Contract also c~ntains the following 
provision, the effect of which is the basis for this dispute 
between the parties: 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute, 
and maintain loans secured by said property of not 
to exceed the then unpaid contract balance hereunder, 
bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed EIGHT 
percent (8%) per annum and payable in regular monthly 
installments provided that the aggregate monthly 
installment payments required to be made by Seller 
on said loans shall not be greater than each install-
ment payment required to be made by the Buyer under 
this contract. When the principal due hereunder has 
been reduced to the amount of any such loans and 
mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer 
agrees to accept title to the above-described pro-
perty subject to said loans and mortgages. 
On or about the 18th day of September and again on or about 
the 18th day of November, 1980, Respondents, through their 
counsel, made written demand upon Appellants for conveyance of 
the property sold under the "Thorpe" Contract pursuant to para-
graph 8 therein (R. 111). Appellants provided Respondents with 
a written refusal to each demand, together with an explanation as 
to the inapplicability of paragraph 8 of the Contract to the 
"Pope" obligation (R. 122) • 
On or about the 4th day of December, 1980, Respondents com-
menced this action against Appellants seeking the remedy of 
specific performance to require Appellants to convey title to 
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the property to Respondents under the "Thorpe" Contract (R. 1-28). 
Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
alleging that "no material issue of fact exists in the case and 
that [Respondents] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law" 
(R. 108-109). Said Motion was heard by the Sixth Judicial Distric 
Court, Honorable Don v. Tibbs, on the 16th day of October, 1981, 
at which time each of the facts set forth herein was agreed 
upon and stipulated to by Respondents (R. 22, 34). The court, 
however, refused Appellants' request to allow the production of 
evidence clarifying the intent of the parties concerning the 
disputed provision, granted Respondents' Motion, and entered 
a final order requiring that upon Respondents' reduction of the 
"Thorpe" c·ontract balance to an amount less than the unpaid 
balance on the "Pope" Agreement, Appellants must convey the pro-
perty to Respondent, each party to bear its own costs and 
attorney's fees in the matter (R. 135-136). Appellants respect-
fully appeal from said final order. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF 
UNRESOLVED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT CREATED BY 
AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISIONS. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that, upon motion, a swmnary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith 
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if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
Conversely, if the pleadings, affidavits, and answers to discovery 
on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing 
party, show that there is any genuine issue as to any material 
fact, a motion for summary judgment must be denied. Jensen v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 611 P.2d 363, 
365 (Utah 1980). 
In their Answer to Respondents' Complaint, answers to 
discovery, and affidavits on file herein,·together with the 
copies of documents attached thereto, Appellants specifically 
raise issues of material fact as to whether the "Pope" obligation 
was intended by the parties to be affected by paragraph 8 of the 
"Thorpe" Contract. The court, however, refused to allow evidence 
to be taken concerning the intent of the contracting parties, 
basing its decision on the parol evidence rule. 
The parol evidence rule has been the subject of voluminous 
decisions by this Court. Generally, when parties have negotiated 
on a subject and thereafter reduce the agreement to a written 
contract, it is assumed that all prior negotiations are fused 
into the contract so that it represents the full agreement of the 
parties. Extraneous evidence is, therefore, not ordinarily 
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permitted to add to, subtract from, or contradict the written 
document. Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction Company, 
22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985 (1969). When the subject of a 
dispute is the meaning of the contract, the court "should first 
examine the language of the instruments and accord to it the 
weight and effect which it may show was intended," but if the 
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, the court should then properly 
"consider parol evidence of the parties' intentions." Big 
Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977). Courts 
are thus provided a means by which they can look beyond the 
terms found in the written contract to delineate the intent of 
the contracting p~rties. Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 
(Utah 1980). Facts concerning the respective situations of the 
parties, circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, and 
the purpose of its execution become admissible to ascertain the 
actual intent of the ambiguous provisions. Continental Bank & 
Trust Company v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 892 (1955). 
The ambiguity in the subject "Thorpe" contract involves 
the apparent incongruity between paragraphs 6 and 8. To the 
standard form recital acknowledging the existence of the under-
lying "Pope" obligation, the parties typed at the end of para-
graph 6 the clause, "which shall be the Sellers obligation to 
pay and discharge." Paragraph 8 is a standard form provision 
giving Seller the option to secure, execute, and maintain loans 
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secured by the subject property in any amount less than the out-
standing contract balance. Buyer thereby agrees to take title 
to the subject property subject to said loans when the principal 
balance of the subject contract is reduced to the amount of 
seller's encumbering loans and mortgages. 
The "Pope" obligation does not readily fit into the anti-
cipated "loan" or "mortgage" classification. The fact that the 
parties had a clause typed into the contract unequivocally 
stating that the "Pope" obligation would remain the Seller's 
obligation casts considerable doubt on the validity of Respon-
dents' assertion that it could be assumed under paragraph 8. The 
typewritten clause carries weight over otherwise conflicting 
printed form provisions in a written contract. Bank of Ephraim v. 
Davis, 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977). The parties apparently expressed 
their intent to exclude the "Pope" obligation from the applica-
bility to paragraph 8 by the typed clause of paragraph 6. 
This ambiguity becomes more obvious when the contract is 
viewed in connection with the comparative balances of the "Pope" 
Agreement and "Thorpe" Contract. At the moment of contract 
execution and transfer of the down payment recited therein, the 
balance on the "Thorpe" Contract was reduced below that on the 
"Pope" Agreement. If the parties had intended paragraph 8 of 
the "Thorpe" Contract to apply to the "Pope" obligation, 
Appellants should have at that time conveyed the property, and 
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Respondents should have accepted title to the same subject only 
to the "Pope" obligation. Instead, the parties commenced a 
regular course of payments keeping both agreements separate; 
Respondents paid Appellants on the "Thorpe" Contract, and 
Appellants paid the Popes pursuant to the "Pope" Agreement. Not 
until after two and one41alf years of consistently servicing the 
respective obligations separately, and at a time when in fact 
the principal balance of the "Pope" obligation had again been 
reduced below the balance on the "Thorpe" Contract, did Respon-
dents attempt to invoke the provisions of paragraph 8. 
By refusing to receive any evidence concerning the sur-
rounding circumstances, which would have properly enabled it to 
"look upon the transaction through the eyes of the parties" and 
"know that they understood or intended the ambiguous • • . pro-
visions to mean," the Court prematurely granted judgment on the 
merits of the "Thorpe" Contract alone. Fox Film Corporation v. 
Ogden Theatre Company, 82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294, 296 {1932). 
When the respective parties to a contract place their own con-
struction on the writing and so perform, the Court should receive 
such evidence since it may be considered as persuasive as to 
what their true intention was. Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 
400 P.2d 20, 22 (1965). Failing to consider any such evidence, 
the District Court erred by granting summary judgment. 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
GRANTING SUMMA.RY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT. 
In the lower court, Respondents relied heavily on the 
recent case of Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980). There, 
this Court reversed a lower court judgment and ordered specific 
performance pursuant to the same provision as paragraph 8 
of the "Thorpe" Contract. However, there are significant dif-
ferences of fact in the present case which preclude heavy 
reliance on Hinkle. There, the issues were simple. The same 
piece of proeprty was the sole subject of two consecutive sales. 
The Unifonn Real Estate Contract form was not supplemented by the 
parties' desire for one party to be solely responsible for the 
underlying obligation. Neither was there a variance of security 
offered under the respective contracts. In that case, the con-
tract was found to be unambiguous; the underlying obligation 
could be assumed, forcing transfer of title. 
The contract in this case is not so free from ambiguity. 
As modified by the clause specifically obligating Appellants for 
the "Pope" Agreement, paragraph 6 conflicts with paragraph 8. 
Looking behind the contract to other relevant documents and 
extraneous evidence, the conflicting provisions of modified 
paragraph 6 and paragraph 8 may reasonably be reconciled only by 
excluding the underlying "Pope" obligation from applicability to 
paragraph 8. The clear intent of the contracting parties was to 
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apply paragraph 8 only to subsequent loans or mortgages secured 
by the property. 
One of the major reasons for this exclusion of the "Pope" 
obligation from paragraph 8 was the fact that the two contracts 
covered the sales of different properties. The "Pope" Agreement 
included property on which a motel, restaurant, and three houses 
are located. The "Thorpe" Contract covered only the land on 
which the motel and restaurant stand. In other words, Appellants 
sold a smaller portion of land to Respondents than they had pur-
chased from Pope. It would be impractical to attempt to divide 
title to the property while the entire title rests with Pope 
pending complete satisfaction of the original obligation. 
Furthermore, it would be unfair to subject Appellants to a 
potential default by Respondents on the entire obligation by 
conveying any rights to part of the property which carries the 
obligation for the total property. That was clearly not the 
intent of the parties. Another fact unique to the circumstances 
of this case further demonstrates the inapplicability of Respon-
dents' paragraph 8 assertions. The "Pope" obligation was secured 
not only by the property sold to Respondents, but by the other 
property purchased by Appellants together with their personal 
residences and property located near Panguitch Lake. Finally, 
because of the balloon payments required of Respondents under the 
"Thorpe" Contract which were bargained for by Appellants to enable 
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prepayment and early satisfaction of the "Pope" Agreement, con-
veyance and assumption by Respondents of the "Pope" obligation 
will prolong that obligation by 12 years, unfairly tying up 
Appellants' property not the subject of the "Thorpe" Contract 
(T. 18-19). 
The facts here are much more complex than in Hinkle. The 
"Thorpe" Contract, drafted by Respondent, Nick Faulkner, a real 
estate broker, must be construed strictly against Respondents in 
case of uncertainty. Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 
P.2d 503, 505 (1965). This rule of construction is especially 
applicable when the drafting party seeks to invoke the ambiguous 
provision against the other contracting party. Wells Fargo Bank v. 
Midwest R~alty & Finance, Inc., 544 P.2d 882, 885 (Utah 1975). 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO RESPONDENTS, AND 
NONE SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 54(d) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these Rules, costs shall be allowed as 
a course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
d . t " irec s . • •• This Court has interpreted Rule 54(d) as leaving 
the question of awarding costs in the discretion of the courts. 
Hull v. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245, 247 (1955). The 
sound discretion of the lower court on this should not be dis-
turbed. 
-12-
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Paragraph 21 of the "Thorpe" Contract provides: 
The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they 
default in any of the covenants or agreements con-
tained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay 
all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from 
enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining posses-
sion of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing 
any remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes 
of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pur-
sued by filing a suit or otherwise. 
However, no authority is given in the contract, nor by statute, 
for an award of attorney's fees in absence of a "default" in the 
covenants or agreements set forth in the contract. In the 
final Order from which this appeal is made, the court did not 
declare a default or a breach of contract by Appellants as 
plead by Respondents in their Complaint. Rather, the court 
ordered Respondents to make certain principal payments to 
Appellants and, thereafter, Appellants to convey property to 
Respondents. Without a showing of Appellants' liability, 
therefore, either by contract or by statute, the court correctly 
required each party to pay its own attorney's fees. Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981). 
Attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary with the 
Supreme Court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment 
Company, 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955). Based on similar 
reasoning to that of the lower court in requiring each party to 
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bear its own costs and attorney's fees, this Court ought to 
require each party to continue to so be responsible throughout 
this appeal, regardless of the outcome. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The action of the lower court in granting Respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be reversed. Based on the 
foregoing analysis, this Court should remand the matter to the 
District Court for a trial on the issues concerning the parties' 
intentions concerning the paragraphs 6 and 8 of the "Thorpe" 
Contract and their respective application to the "Pope" obligation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this z 1 day of April' 1982. 
C)~~ 
Robert F. Orton 
T. Richard Davis 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: ( 801) 521-3800 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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